Expanding Human Rights - from individuals to communities

Discussing the statement: "Real human rights are the individual freedoms enshrined in civil and political rights; so-called 'economic, social and cultural rights' may refer to worthy objectives but do not have the compelling force of 'human rights'”.

Human rights are usually defined as natural rights, inherent to an individual, simply because they are human. However, the concept of groups or communities of people having rights, which supercede those of the individual’s exclusive rights, is an equally valid interpretation of the concept of human rights. 

These apparently opposing worldviews are the reason for the superficial distinction made between the so-called individual rights – civil and political (CPR) – predominantly championed by the Western countries, and the “group rights” - social, economic and cultural (ESCR) - which other countries value. 

When the declarations of CPR and ESCR were signed in 1948, countries on both extremes of this spectrum were signatories, and most of the world’s dominant religions were also represented in their countries (Freeman 2002: 10). This would appear to give the declarations some universality and at least the appearance of a compromise between the cultures.

Recent discourse on human rights has introduced the concept of 'development' as a human right, linking CPR with the ESCR necessary to ensure a holistic view of human well-being. 

The 1993 Vienna United Nations Conference on Human Rights resulted in the 'Declaration of the Right to Development as an Inalienable Human Right', bringing the long-neglected interests of developing countries back onto the international agenda. 

When the original Declarations of Human Rights were being negotiated, after World War II, Roosevelt and others involved had envisioned these rights as inter-related, and in fact had emphasised rights like freedom from want, which is an economic right. 

This view was subsequently held hostage to 'Cold War' politics, causing Western countries to downplay what they viewed as the essentially socialist ESCR, and focus on CPR instead, in line with the neo-liberal democratic agenda (Sengupta 2001: 2527). 

Yet, in measuring the success of development in countries, the United Nations (UN) uses the Human Development Index (HDI) - which measures life expectancy, access to health and education, and other economic and social factors (HDR 2000: 20).

The Right to Development

The 'Declaration of the Right to Development' is concerned with a qualitative improvement in the living standards of all people, and emphasises the need for participation, contribution and equal distribution of the benefits of development processes (Article 2 Cl.3). This is simply fleshing out the concept of self-determination which is the basis of most human rights discourse, as both an individual, and a group or National right (Article 1 Cl.1 & Article 2 Cl.1). 

The declaration then takes further steps, placing the responsibility for ensuring the appropriate social and economic reforms to guarantee an environment conducive to this type of development, including the introduction of proactive policies and programs, on states (Articles 2 Cl.3, 3, 6 Cl.3 & 8). 

Even more challenging, is the statement (Article 2 Cl.2) of a mutual responsibility held by all people, individually and collectively, to act out of dutiful respect for others and foster co-operation with the whole process of development. 

Finally, international co-operation is required to ensure any obstacles to equitable development are removed, which cannot be achieved by individual states, or those with weaker economies and limited resources (Article 3 Cl.3 & Article 4).

This is a truly remarkable document, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of many of its signatories, and it heralds the next phase of human rights on the international stage – the so-called ‘third generation’ or group rights. 

With this holistic approach to human wellbeing, comes new avenues of international co-operation, incorporating environmental activism, protection of bio-diversity and indigenous cultures (Hurrell 1999: 293), as well as efforts to guarantee nuclear disarmament (Article 7) and the rights of future generations. 

These are often criticised as lofty and general goals, lacking the inalienable legitimacy of 'basic' human rights, and perhaps seen by some as unaffordable luxuries. 

Basic needs may be sufficient demands for animals, however, it is obvious that a human life is hardly worth living in fear, insecurity and violence, or surrounded by potentially harmful environmental pollution, and bereft of the beauty and diversity many of us take for granted.

To lose sight of this, in a morass of debates over technicalities and definitions, would rob all of us of the potential to progress to a higher level of humanity and consciousness than has ever been possible before. 

It has been pointed out that each 'generation' of rights corresponds to one of the 'Rights of Man' declared during the French Revolution – liberty (CPR), equality (ESCR), and fraternity (Development, Environment and Peace) or solidarity rights (Wellman 2000: 639).  

This progressive consciousness also corresponds to the move from individualism to communitarianism and then to globalism. “Individual states acting alone can no longer satisfy the obligations imposed by even the first and second generations of human rights” (Wellman 2000: 642). What is called for is the global co-operation of like-minded people across National frontiers (Hurrell 1999: 288).

Western Democracy as a guarantee of Human Rights

Democracy, as propagated in the current dogma of ‘good governance’ (accountability, transparency, participation), and modelled by Western countries, has noble and worthy aims, but lacks moral depth and spirituality, since it has been stripped of all reference to any meta-narrative, in order to make it more palatable to a postmodern world. 

Even the founding philosophies of the 'contract theorists', like Locke, are considered out of vogue, with their insistence on ‘natural’ rights. People seem more comfortable acknowledging the legitimacy of human rights based solely on legal codes, and the growing international consensus generated around them (Donnelly 1993: 31). 

Yet, as Muzaffar has eloquently reminded us, 
"these… worldviews are marginalising other ideas about the human being, about human relations and about societal ties embodied in older and richer civilisations…which could, in the long run, result in the moral degradation and spiritual impoverishment of the human being" (Muzaffar 1999: 27). 

And "without a larger spiritual and moral framework, which endows human endeavour with meaning and purpose, with coherence and unity, wouldn’t the emphasis on rights per se lead to moral chaos and confusion?" (Muzaffar 1999: 29). Even a superficial examination of Western society shows that these concerns are already a reality we have to deal with.

The debate about 'Asian Values' concerns a similar protest against the ethical foundations of human rights, as they are perceived to be too individualistic and removed from responsibilities towards society. 

Asian people place a lot of value on community, family, respect for authority, consensus, sacrifice and hard work (Mauzy 1997: 215,216). As one Malaysian observed, “our history has taught us to fear, not so much the tyranny of government, but the chaos of anarchy and the shackles of poverty” (Mauzy 1997: 218). 

Most Western Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and activists see human rights from their own culturally-biased viewpoints, and may even be responsible for further reinforcing the global hegemony of 'democracy' as the supreme deliverer of freedom, further separating East and West in the current debate (Mauzy 1997: 223). 

Instead, we need to be aware of the fact that norms for the legitimation of sovereignty are not only culturally influenced, but change over time, and 'democracy', as the dominant norm in human rights debates today, is no less vulnerable to being replaced by another theory (Barkin 1998: 251). 

The impact of globalisation on Human Rights

In addition to their insubstantial ethical foundations, the first two 'generations' of human rights lack the scope and universality necessary to negotiate international issues in a globalised world. 

The 'Declaration of the Right to Development' mentions alleviation of the external debt burden faced by developing countries, as an example of a global issue which would be an obstacle to the rights of people within these countries, draining government resources which could otherwise be invested in life-enhancing projects locally. 

This is not the only instance where the rights of a state or group are the precondition to fulfillment of individual rights and development (Sengupta 2001: 2534). Only through the democratisation and emphasis on the interdependent nature of international relations, can the selfish domination of superpowers, through the international economic order, be restrained. 

A “cosmopolitan” model, with individuals and NGOs applying pressure from below, whilst the global community applies pressure from above (Donnelly 1993: 31), assumes an integrity and consistency on the part of the participants in global affairs which is unsupported by historical experience.

The conventional concept of states and 'sovereignty' has been severely challenged by globalisation, leaving governments powerless to effect the changes necessary to protect their populations from the consequences of belonging to an international political and economic order - transnational corporations (TNCs), international financial institutions (IFIs) and their 'structural adjustment programs' (SAPs). 

These limitations are not entirely new, as states have always essentially had to balance the idea of individual freedoms with state intervention to protect the rights of the marginalised in society (Evans 2001: 625). However, these relatively recent limitations on the State have in many cases reduced states to administrators of global regulations (Evans 2001: 626) and international agreements - which are seldom debated in the domestic arena before their acceptance. (HDR 2000: 69) 

Most of these demands and adjustments negatively impact on human rights, and the evidence points to a failure of states to follow democratic principles, even an inability to do so (Evans 2001: 627).

The present tendency of the United States especially, to encourage 'low-intensity democracies', in an effort to gag political protesters and subdue ethnic tensions in developing countries, rather than allow them the right of self-determination, is a sinister indication of the true agenda of the superpowers and their global investors. 

“Thus ‘poor relief’ and ‘riot control’ ‘help to sustain the emerging social structure of the world by minimising the risk of chaos in the bottom layer’…democracy and human rights are of limited interest when social unrest threatens the smooth continuation of the practices of globalisation” (Evans 2001: 632). 

Those who suffer culturally, socially and economically from the processes of development in their countries, are seen as the unfortunate bearers of the price of economic progress, for the good of the majority (Evans 2001: 635). Contrary to 'trickle-down' theory, two thirds of the world’s population have not shared in the economic gain of decades of development (Thomas 1998:165). 

The ruling elite in the international economy see them as 
“'superfluous billions’ unable to engage in the liberal, free market, consumer oriented global order”, and therefore they “do not qualify for a voice in shaping a future global order” (George 1999 in Evans 2001:637).

Other global issues include the political and cultural marginalisation of ethnic minorities (HDR 2000: 59), growing unemployment and poverty, environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, corruption, greed and extreme materialism (Muzaffar 1999: 30). 

The lack of clear role definitions, and declarations to enforce these, confirms the history of human rights as a gradual raising of human consciousness, with people aiming for new levels of dignity, respect and mutual responsibility even though these are not immediately attainable everywhere. 

Even cultural differences (and 'asian values') are not entirely restrictive in this regard, as all cultures are fluid and inter-relate with others in complex ways (Hurrell 1999: 293). It is only a matter of time and effort, and legislation will be aligned to the next level, or third generation ideals. 

The need to democratise the institutions operating above states, to level the playing field for all participants in the global economic and political arena, is indisputable (Evans 2001: 639).  

The impact of Neoliberal economic policies

The dominant paradigm of neo-liberal democracy (and its economic theories) has failed historically to improve the lives of more than half the world’s population, who still earn less than $2 (US) a day (Thomas 1998:165), and live with malnutrition, disease and civil war. 

Economic policies, based as they are on the growth of 'Gross National Products' (GNP) and the belief that this would eventually increase every individual’s autonomy and standard of living, is at best a simplistic worldview. 

Reliance on Smith’s 'invisible hand' theory, where the market is seen as providing opportunities for all, driven by each participant’s pursuit of self-interest, without interference from governments and regulations (Habbard 1999:2), has not delivered the goods.

‘Market forces’ have not ensured equitable distribution of the benefits of development (Ghai 1999: 259), empowerment of the poor, or even a ‘level playing field’ at the outset – a concept much cherished by proponents of economic theory. 

Hayek criticised “mankind’s mistaken confidence in reason’s capacity to take control of social processes to shape society in accordance with particular ideals” (Routledge 2000: 335). The Hayekian 'autonomous market' has not brought freedom, but a framework of global economic demands within which states must act, to ensure exaggerated protection of property, rather than human rights promotion (Ghai 1999: 252). 

Instead of a free market, we witness a powerful and wealthy minority directing the affairs of the world, to protect international capital rather than human lives.

The accumulation of wealth is touted as the end to aim for, rather than a means to achieving other ends, like happiness, true freedom and wellbeing. 

Since the market is obviously already directed towards the fulfillment of a certain group’s needs, it can surely be turned around, to aid in the propagation of more equitable ideals? 

What is needed is beneficial structural adjustment and a re-examination of maximum possible profits, favouring trade-offs for equity and justice (Sengupta 2001: 2536).  After all, what is the point of democratic rule, if not to allow people to decide what principles and ideals should guide decisions and the implementation of policies on their behalf?

Asian markets seem to have benefitted from government regulation, contrary to expectations, and although human rights were far from being a high priority in their development agendas, this does point to intervention in the market forces as a feasible course of action. 

Many see the Asian financial crisis of a few years ago as an ‘optimal crisis’, which proved the need for social safety nets to be put into place, to prevent similar social chaos being experienced again (Habbard 1999:3). 

Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen has recently shown the 'conjunction of rationalities' between economic rationality and the ethics of human rights thinking, which is also based on rationality, although this was previously denied equal respect, due to narrow conceptions of what constitutes rationality. 

Sen mentions famines in authoritarian countries as an example of the interplay between the two lines of thought – famines are linked to lack of accountability of governments to the people, rather than limited resources in a country (Habbard 1999: 4). 

In fact, the elements of democracy seen as promoting human rights – accountability, freedom of expression, freedom of information, participation and better redistribution – are at the same time prerequisites for a healthy business and investment environment (Habbard 1999:5).

Conclusion

It is clear that human rights are a rich tapestry, interwoven with both civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. 

When separated artificially from each other, these rights lose not only their full meaning and inter-connectedness, but also their feasibility and practical application becomes lopsided and ineffective. 

The 'Right to Development', recently revived in the human rights debate, is one way of placing human rights in a holistic framework. 

The impact of globalisation and neo-liberal economic policies on countries, proves that democracy (CPR), as the narrow focus of Western human rights discourse, must be accompanied by wide reform programs (including ESCR) to deliver qualitative and equitable improvements. 

Furthermore, “for us who seek inspiration and guidance from our spiritual and moral philosophies in a non-selective manner…The individual and community must both submit to spiritual and moral values which transcend both individual and community…This then, is the road we must travel; the journey we must undertake. From Western human rights, which has been so selective and sectarian, to a genuinely universal human dignity – which remains the human being’s yet unfulfilled promise to God” (Muzaffar 1999: 29-31).

References:

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Human Rights Manual 1998’, http://www.dfat.gov.au/hr/hr_manual/chp1.html Accessed 11 August 2003.

Barkin, J.S. 1998, The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the Emergence of Human Rights Norms, Development Programme, Human Development Report’ (HDR) Office, Occasional Paper 40, 2000 http://www.undp.org/hdro/hdrs/1999/english/flinterman.pdf ch.1,3 Accessed 11 August 2003.

Donnelly, J. 1993,’ International Human Rights’, Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 24-32

Evans, T. 2001, If Democracy, Then Human Rights?,’ Third World Quarterly’, vol.22, pp.623-642

Flinterman, C. & Gutter J. 2000, The United Nations and Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges, ‘United Nations Freeman, M. 2002, ‘Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach’, Polity, Cambridge, 2002, pp.32-42

Ghai, Y. 1999, Rights, Social Justice, and Globalisation in East Asia in Joanne R.Bauer and Daniel A.Bell (eds), ‘The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.241-203

Habbard, A. 1999, ‘Economic Interests vs. Human Rights’ http://www.fidh.org/ecosoc/lettres/intecoa.htm Accessed 11 August 2003

Hurrell, A. 1999, Power, Principles and Prudence: Protecting Human Rights in a Deeply Divided World in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds), ‘Human Rights in Global Politics’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 277-302

Mauzy, D.K. 1997, The Human Rights and “Asian Values” Debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues, ‘The Pacific Review’, vol.10, pp.210-236

‘Millenium: Journal of International Studies’, vol.27, pp.229-235, 246-252

Muzaffar, C. 1999, From Human Rights to Human Dignity in Peter Van Ness (ed.), ‘Debating Human Rights: Critical Essays from the United States and Asia’, Routledge, London, pp.25-31

‘Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2000’, Routledge, New York, p.335.

Sengupta A. 2001, Right to Development as a Human Right, ‘Economic and Political Weekly’, vol.36, no.27, 7 July 2001, pp. 2527-2536

Thomas, C. 1998, International Financial Institutions and Social and Economic Human Rights: An Exploration in Tony Evans (ed.), ‘Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp.161-165

United Nations General Assembly, ‘The Universal Declaration on the Right to Development’, passed 4 December 1986. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm Accessed 18 August 2003

United Nations General Assembly, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, passed 10 December 1948. http://www.unesco.org/general/eng/legal/human-rights.shmtl Accessed 3 March 2003

United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, ‘Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights’ http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wcbangk.htm accessed 3 March 2003

Wellman, C. 2000, Solidarity, the Individual and Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Quarterly’, vol. 22, pp.639-644

Peace building - deeper, wider, higher

Peacebuilding is not meeting all of its objectives - as can easily be seen by watching the news on television on any evening. Many theories have been propagated surrounding the processes of aid, relief, recovery and reconstruction in countries suffering the effects of political emergencies and conflict - most are critical of current approaches.

The resounding calls for a new attitude towards conflict resolution and peacebuilding as complex, long-term processes - requiring multi-level actors and holistic solutions - are indicative of a new wave of pluralist thinking in the field (“deeper”). Even those who still assume the dominant neoliberal paradigm is the only alternative, admit that it needs to be deeper and broader - with significant compromises in terms of its administration.

The most inspiring peace theorists summon us to higher levels of spirituality, regarding vision as the most important factor in guiding humanity towards the goal of peace and harmony (“higher”). Balancing the need for a new state of consciousness, is the need for practical approaches to be developed organically, involving local actors in bottom-up processes (“wider”). 

This multi-faceted model would redefine the role of peacemakers and Peacebuilders - as visionaries who facilitate the realisation of locally-initiated social and political change, garner international support for programs, and maintain solidarity with the people as they journey towards peace.

This piece is an attempt to review and reflect upon some of the main theories in conflict resolution, reconstruction and peacebuilding - beginning with the debate surrounding the various stages in the recovery process, and an attempt to categorise some of the terms applied to each step. In this respect, theoretical analysis has greatly contributed to deeper levels of understanding in the field, and can be applied to the design and implementation of clear strategies.

The necessary elements of long-term Peacebuilding are then briefly discussed, followed by an elaboration on the main reasons for the current failure of Peacebuilding to achieve all of its goals. The factors often mentioned are a lack of resources, and the problematic nature of external intervention - due to the internationally revered concept of state sovereignty - and neoliberalist views.

In addition, intervention is not always welcomed by recipient states, or those who reject concepts like universal human rights and globalism, seeing these as excuses for cultural domination by the West. Other issues to be faced are the dominance of donor interests and agendas in post-conflict situations, and the need for an ethical framework and other reforms.

Finally, and despite much lip-service paid to this issue, there is a need for greater local participation, capacity-building, education and research into the unique local conditions and needs in every country. Peacebuilding is a mammoth task, and there is no shortage of theories about the best methods and models, but there is a common thread of hope running through even the most realistic critic's work.

This hope is what inspires all who wish to make a difference, taking the plunge into a world of conflict, and establishing little islands of peace along the way. We must keep swimming - helping others to keep their heads above water until land is in sight.

The contribution of theory to Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding

· Conflict Transformation

Classical Conflict Resolution focused on enabling participants to resolve their differences by nonviolent means, through the negotiations which lead to a peace settlement (Miall et al. 1999:18). However, this approach has broadened in recent years to include efforts made to prevent conflict being expressed in violent ways, through the negotiation process, to the continuing resolution and management of issues in the post-settlement phase (Miall et al. 1999:18).

In this way violent conflict is transformed into social change by a process which includes prevention of conflict formation, peacekeeping to end violence, and peacemaking to transform conflict into a compromise viable enough to usher in the slow process of peacebuilding or social change (Miall et al. 1999:18).

Ryan distinguishes between "Peacekeeping, which aims for a reduction in violent conflict behaviour, and Peacemaking, which aims to resolve conflicting interests" (Miall et al. 1999:187).

These theoretical definitions have been useful for designing and discussing programs for post-conflict situations, however in practice these phases overlap and the borders of responsibility are blurred - resulting in confusion, gaps in implementation and administrative difficulties.

· Continuum - from Relief to Development

White & Cliffe discuss the problems encountered when attempting to define or categorise the various stages in recovery or Peacebuilding. "Relief" is seen to encompass the five essentials of protection, rescue, health, food, water, and shelter (White & Cliffe 2000:322). "Development" is considered to be a movement towards peace, justice, social equity; and a decline in ignorance, disease and poverty (White & Cliffe 2000:322).

The "Continuum from Relief to Rehabilitation and Development", as it is called by the UN in its 1991 General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (White & Cliffe 2000:316), states that emergency assistance must support long-term recovery, and international support should continue after the initial relief stage, as an opportunity to improve facilities and services (White & Cliffe 2000:316).

For this reason, the World Bank focus since the mid-90s has been on post-conflict reconstruction to "close the gap between relief and development" and ensure a "sustainable peace" (World Bank 1998 in White & Cliffe 2000:318). The challenge seems to be to overcome the distinctions of agencies and integrate relief, rehabilitation and development within a long-term strategy (OECD 1997 in White & Cliffe 2000:319).

· Peacebuilding Contiguum

Peacebuilding is mentioned in a 1996 UN Report, stating that post-conflict recovery programs supporting peace by linking relief and development are essential, and at the same time can address the immediate needs of the community (White & Cliffe 2000:317).

The European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) prefers to use the term "Contiguum" when discussing the Peacebuilding process – "reflecting the fact that operations in relief, rehabilitation and development may all be ongoing simultaneously within any given country” (ECHO, 1996 in White & Cliffe 2000:318).

Simpler models underestimate the chronic nature of political, economic and social instability, and therefore "peacebuilding must be an intrinsic element of development co-operation strategies" (White & Cliffe 2000:318). For White & Cliffe, "Rehabilitation" is the bridge between relief and development, and "Peacebuilding" is the process of developing local capacity and structural programs or processes which strengthen peace, and "decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violence" (White & Cliffe 2000:322).

This definition "cuts across the conflict/peace and relief/ development axes" (White & Cliffe 2000:322), resulting in a more holistic approach to Peacebuilding. 

While it is true that often conflict will be continuing even as development programs are implemented, undermining efforts at Peacebuilding, and potentially legitimising those guilty of human rights abuses, there is still a need to find an "entry point" to do whatever good can be done (White & Cliffe 2000:323,325).

· Peacebuilding as a complex system

Lederach also feels that Peacebuilding must be planned with the whole system in mind - looking at the bigger picture or context within which each component or stage should be understood (Lederach 1998:178). He compares this system to a building design, to be completed within a certain timeframe, defining levels of activity in stages, and understanding its complex nature (Lederach 1998:178).

Lederach's model of the timeframe required for peacebuilding covers four stages in a complex system, with some overlapping between the stages (Lederach 1998:180):

Action (first 2-6 months) is the first response to an emergency or crisis (Lederach 1998:180); but to avoid remaining in a “permanently emerging crisis”, we need to respond to, but not be driven by, this crisis mentality (Lederach 1998:183).

Preparation (lasting 1-2 years) is the next phase we should progress towards, involving training and equipping of participants in projects designed to develop local capacity (Lederach 1998:179). To extend the view beyond the life of the project requires constant linking of immediate action with long-term goals (Lederach 1998:179).

Design is required at this point, ushering in the third phase of five to ten years, where every step should be practical and evaluated in terms of its contribution to social change (Lederach 1998:179).

The Outcome, or final phase, is at least a period of twenty years from the emergency or crisis, and involves major structural and social change (Lederach 1998:179). Here the importance of "dreamkeepers" is emphasised - those who will keep the vision alive to usher in generational change (Lederach 1998:179).

These are idealistic but inspiring theories to guide Peacebuilders towards a brighter future, and keep us all motivated throughout the long, demanding journey. "Today we demand instant reconciliation" (Rees 2000 2000:16), as in the case of Rwanda, where one commentator noted:

"The most lamentable example was the rush to promote reconciliation over the understandable resistance of those who had suffered immensely" (Miall 1996 1996:8).

However post-conflict situations are complex and require patience and long-term vision from Peacebuilders. It is becoming increasingly obvious, for example, that

"We can't put a peacekeeping soldier behind every Burundian...Should foreign troops be deployed in Burundi, one can only hope that they will stay for fifty years, in other words, the time that it would take to teach two generations of Burundians how to live in peace"

(Abdallah in Trintignac 1999 1999:59).

The necessary elements of Peacebuilding

a) A Web of micro and macro levels

Lederach emphasises the need for Peacebuilding to move beyond its current frontiers, to something more sustainable - beyond short-term, to generational change; beyond hierarchy, to organic and broad-based participation; beyond political transition alone, to a web of "whole body politic" in a radically changing environment; beyond fear, to hope! (Lederach 1998:189).

Lederach's pyramid of actors and approaches to peacebuilding, illustrates a comprehensive multi-levelled effort, with society and grass-roots leaders taking part in local peace commissions, middle-level leaders being involved in problem-solving workshops, and high-level negotiations carried out by the top leaders or elite members of society (Miall et al. 1999:20).

Although the conventional approach to peacebuilding has been top-down, with energy centered on the top-level leaders and their political or military activities, Lederach calls for an "organic" model to replace hierarchy (Lederach 1998:183,185). This model should encourage the formation of what Saunders refers to as the "whole body politic" - a web of interdependent activities and people, cutting across all levels of the society (Lederach 1998:185).

This system would have a binding effect, holding people and processes together; and would take into account the reality that changes in one component system affect all the others; while no one part controls the whole process (Lederach 1998:185).

Pugh describes the World Bank's assistance as concentrating on civil society and enabling a country to resume commercial activities (Pugh 2000:113). The OECD, in turn, focuses on the state, giving priority to

"Restoring internal security and the rule of law, legitimising state institutions, establishing the conditions for economic growth, and improving food security and social services" (Pugh 2000:113).

This reflects the different goals followed by various institutions - for example the state or government actors are on the macro level of society, and have very different activities or goals to NGOs, who are on the micro level (Pugh 2000:113). These conflicting goals often result in organisations working against each other, ignoring the bigger picture - the common vision of peace.

Conventional approaches have also caused local people to experience a "process paradox" because the official negotiating table is perceived as a measure of group validation or identity needs, and after years of struggle, the results may be disappointing (Lederach 1998:185). As the marginalised have no direct access to the process, there is little ownership or responsibility for the final agreement, and feelings of powerlessness are inevitable (Lederach 1998:185). In addition, some leaders may manipulate the political context for personal gain, as there is no accountability (Lederach 1998:185).

Instead, Lederach's "infrastructure for peace" is the "foundation that will ultimately hold up the house" (Lederach 1998:185) - genuine participation and empowerment should be a priority through all stages of the process if it is to have long-term success.

b) Transformation and the Web of Reconciliation

Brown summarises the common causes of internal conflict in countries as "irresponsible leaders driven by intensifying elite competitions; problematic group histories; and economic problems" (Brown 1996 in Miall et al.1999:91).

It appears that usually all three factors are present before the conflict results in violence, therefore to avoid conflict and build peace, sustained efforts must target all levels: developing good systems for political governance and increasing the capacity of leaders; building community capacity for forgiveness, compromise and tolerance; and developing ways of boosting and managing the economy of the country wisely.

Lederach views Peacebuilding as a complex process which gradually evolves through various phases, from the immediate Agenda or Task, to Transition and Transformation, and finally resulting in Reconciliation (Lederach 1998:186-8).

These phases involve many overlapping aspects, such as the socio-economic, socio-political, socio-psychological and spiritual changes which together compose a "Web of Reconciliation" (Lederach 1998:187). Again, the emphasis is on the interlinked, organic nature of the processes, making the recurring imagery of a "web" the most appropriate and inspiring descriptive model.

The socio-economic activities required include financial aid, retraining, employment and development (Lederach 1998:186-7). Socio-political aspects to address involve demobilising, disarming, and integrating troops back into society, as well as repatriating refugees (Lederach 1998:186-7). Socio-psychological needs must be met at the same time, and ways devised to deal with identity issues, emotions, grief and trauma (Lederach 1998:186-7).

Finally, Reconciliation must be seen as not only the end goal, but also a journey, which opens a social space for dialogue, relationships and building, forgiveness and healing, self and other (Lederach 1998:186-9). Kriesberg elaborates on these intangible stages of reconciliation - stepping through truth and acknowledgement, to justice and restitution, then mercy, forgiveness and healing, and finally arriving at peace, security and well-being (Miall et al.1999:209).

This process requires an acknowledgement of the truth, and the pain of past injustices, but must pave the way to start afresh with former enemies -

"This is not forgive and forget. This is not remember, justify and repeat. True reconciliation is to remember and change...Spiritual is the best term to describe this search that goes beyond the political, economic, and psychological...toward self, enemy, and God...transformation and the restoration of relationship"

(Lederach 1998:189).

Why does Peacebuilding not meet its objectives?

1. “Resources are limited”

Lofty ideals aside, the present system is failing - as it appears to favour what Ottaway 2003 refers to as the "bargain-basement imperial solution" - an "attempt to rebuild a collapsed state according to a favourable model but with minimal resources" (Ottaway 2003:265). Even more damaging, Pugh points out that arms exports to conflict-prone areas have continued, while development assistance has decreased over the last decade (Pugh 2000:114).

Aid organisations struggle to obtain funding for social development programs like human rights education, because these do not deliver instant and visible results (Pugh 2000:115). Humanitarian agencies are increasingly expected to deliver welfare, but where government structures and funding do not exist either, this is an unrealistic expectation by the international community (Pugh 2000:116). Peacebuilding programs therefore suffer from a lack of allocated resources within aid packages, and are prone to rapidly fading interest as new causes receive the attention of the donor community (Pugh 2000:116).

White & Cliffe also feel there has been "an attack on humanitarianism" - the idea that relief aid harms and is failing to build peace - which is being used to justify not intervening in non-strategic countries around the world (Macrae 1998 in White & Cliffe 2000:320).

Furthermore, it has been observed that

"Those requiring humanitarian assistance must make sure that they, and especially their leaders, subscribe to the right attitudes if they are to be eligible" (Duffield 2003 :307).

There is considerable consensus on this point amongst peace theorists, and Yannis laments:

"It is therefore worth asking whether it is only the machinery to deal with state collapse that is missing from the international system today, or also the community values that are required in order to develop adequate international responses?" (Yannis 2003:76)

Clearly the international system is not lacking dollars, but love and compassion.

2. External Intervention is problematic

2.1 Tension between State Sovereignty and Human Rights

In the absence of an international framework, the tension between the long-revered concept of state sovereignty and the modern concern with protection of human rights prevents decisive, well co-ordinated intervention policies by the international community (Yannis 2003:71).

A fresh approach is required - realising that the idea of “sovereignty” could be broadened to become an inclusive value –

"Such a view unites people beyond borders...and would focus attention on the needs of people seeking assistance and protection. A sovereignty of universal values would be reflected in the practices of democracies whose leaders regarded boundaries as porous not impenetrable...a creative exercise of power to enhance dialogue and to contribute to a culture of tolerance and hospitality"

(Rees 2003 2003:259).

Assumptions about the very nature of states need to be re-evaluated in light of the increasing number of states suffering collapse since the end of the Cold War - pointing beyond countries' particular histories and circumstances, to deeper problems with the concept of the Westphalian State system itself (Milliken & Krause 2003:14).

Some even proclaim this is the "birth of a genuinely post-colonial order", as the previous externally imposed style of governance implodes through lack of internal support, and is gradually replaced by organic structures (Doornbos 2003:46, Ottaway 2003:247).

These "novel forms of government" should be supported wherever possible, rather than clinging determinedly to the current statist system (Doornbos 2003:53-54). Many have also argued that areas like sub-Saharan Africa should be allowed to evolve into new "non-state" political structures, which better suite the regional circumstances (Paris 2002:19), but Peacebuilders are determined to continue to support an institutional form of the "Westphalian state" in many areas where this ideology and the state itself have "no roots" (Paris 2002:20).

This is similar to the behaviour of the US and Russia during the Cold War, Paris reminds us (Paris 2002:20). The International system is itself constantly propagating the norm that the principle units of the international system are states, and that the territorial security of each of these is fundamental to the security of the whole world (Paris 2002:20).

Recently, the challenge to universalism has also been raised resoundingly from countries objecting to the Western conception of human rights, due to

"Their individualist underpinnings, these rights entail dissolving the very foundations of cultures which are organised around the notions of communal obligations, commitment and service"

(Esteva 2003 & Prakash 2003:282).

It is therefore no surprise that counter-cultures are rising up around the globe, to "successfully oppose globalism with radical pluralism, conceived for going beyond Western monoculturalism - now made up and disguised as ‘multiculturalism'" (Esteva 2003 & Prakash 2003:286).

An idea that seems to be receiving popular support, is one of "reducing the body politic" to the level of community, where it is once more accessible and human in scale (Esteva 2003 & Prakash 2003:287).

As an example of this approach, White& Cliffe argue that the UN focus on restoring the centralised Somali state to power has prevented them from seeing the opportunities for supporting long-term stability in areas like Somaliland and Puntland (White & Cliffe 2000:332,333). The Somalia Aid Co-ord Body (SACB) has, instead, adopted a strategy of differentiation between zones of crisis, transition and recovery, and its programs are planned accordingly, impacting the manner in which aid is offered (White & Cliffe 2000:334).

2.2 Neoliberal Internationalism

Paris presents the view that Peacebuilders attempt to bring war-torn states into conformity with internationally accepted standards of "good governance", which he likens to the colonialism or "mission civilisatrice" of previous centuries (Paris 2002:1). Although now the “civilised” and “uncivilised” parts of the globe are defined according to their acceptance or rejection of liberal market democracy - considered the superior model of governance (Paris 2002:1).

This process of the globalisation of market ideology does not undermine the state as commonly thought - rather, it presupposes the existence of a strong state, otherwise these institutions must first be built (Paris 2002:2). In fact, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have made aid contingent on recipient states adopting economic and political liberalisation and democratic institutions (Paris 2002:3).

NGOs also mostly support the transformation of states to liberal market democracy, and assume that this is the best model, although even the idea of "grassroots participation" is a Western idea (Paris 2002:4).

Multilateral agencies appear to use post-conflict situations to introduce market-friendly frameworks and democratic values, as it is assumed that these "can eventually provide the means for any nation to resolve internal conflicts peacefully and fairly" (Stremlau 1998 in Doornbos 2003 2003:56-57).

However, little attention has been given to erradicating the deeper underlying causes of global conflicts, like poverty, injustice and discrimination (Yannis 2003 2003:76). Both recovery and peace should be pursued simultaneously, as they effect each other. 

Conventional structural adjustment programs should not be rigidly implemented - allowances should be made for larger public spending in initial stages, consideration of distributional implications of aid conditions and performance criteria included for peace-related commitments (Patrick 1999:47).

The existence of "shadow networks" must also be taken into account, as these "alternative forms of existence" ensure a constant flow of food, medicine and other goods across borders, despite official development efforts (Duffield 2003:299). This "reflexive modernisation" is viewed by Duffield 2003 as a process of

"Dissolution, redeployment and reintegration [into]...liberal globalisation [where]...new non-liberal forms of protection, legitimacy and rights to wealth have been created" (Duffield 2003:300).

Instead, most reconstruction and development programs aim to facilitate the participation of the poor in a market economy - rather than providing alternatives to this system of governance (Paris 2002:5). Paris reminds us that this is because the most powerful International organisations all have a Western bias, as the most powerful and richest states have the most voting power, and most of the member countries are liberal market democracies (Paris 2002:4).

2.3 Is this a new form of Colonialism or Exploitation?

As Rees points out in a book about his first-hand experience of the last ten years of UN peacekeeping operations,

"Increasingly the UN is being asked to take on the functions of government. First in Cambodia...then in both Kosovo and East Timor. [Yet] It had become very clear how hard these tasks were and how ill-prepared the UN is to govern" (Rees 2000: 382).

Rees adds that this new role is similar to that of a "colonial administration" - yet "with none of the resources of empires gone by" " (Rees 2000: 383).

Peacebuilders shape the content of peace agreements while they are being drafted (Paris 2002:6), and by providing "expert" advice on the implementation of settlements to parties of war-torn states (Paris 2002:8). In addition, aid conditionalities imposed by International agencies include specific economic and political reforms - such as privatisation, the removal of subsidies and wage or price controls, lifting of barriers to foreign goods and investment, and certain democratic political practices (Paris 2002:9). 

The most obvious intervention in the post-conflict recovery process of a country, has been through the performance of quasi-governmental functions, called "proxy governance" by Osler, where International actors stand in for locals who are unable or unwilling to perform these administrative tasks (Paris 2002:9).

It is widely accepted that these interventions are not purely altruistic, but are determined by the national security interests of dominant countries like the permanent members of the UN Security Council (Paris 2002:17). However, Peacebuilding missions are usually at the request of local parties - for a limited period of time, with the approval of International organisations, and with the goal of establishing self-government in the afflicted country (Paris 2002:17).

The poorest countries have also been targeted, and "the balance sheet of peacebuilding simply does not sustain the economic exploitation thesis" (Paris 2002:18). The exploitation of these recipient countries is usually in the form of the ideological strings attached to aid and development programs - considered to be

"a new phase in the ongoing and evolving relationship between the core and the periphery of the International system, with the core continuing to define the standards of acceptable behaviour, and International Peacebuilding agencies serving as 'transmission belts' that convey these standards to the periphery" (Paris 2002:18).

The most dominant of these ideologies are neoliberalism and democracy, covering the very idea of what states should look like and how they are expected to act (Paris 2002:18). Most NGOs, however, feel that they have no choice but to work with unrepresentative faction leaders, because as outsiders they do not feel free to judge local authorities (White & Cliffe 2000:334).

Donors must acknowledge and support the role of local government and existing structures in peacebuilding initiatives wherever possible (Patrick 1999: 53). External intervention should also facilitate and build local capacity for long-term change, including training and technical assistance, raising funds for important projects and ensuring debt relief (Patrick 1999: 54-56).

3. NGO/Donor Agendas

3.1 Donor Interests and Aid Conditionality

Boyce 2003 notes that Donor interests - the strategic or trade interests of Western Industrialised states - dominate most International agencies and their policies (Boyce 2003:276-7). These interests include short-term commercial advantage and company contracts, and the hasty repatriation of refugees residing in donor countries (Boyce 2003:277).

But balancing this self-interest, is the fact that nowadays "public opinion can make a 'necessity of virtue'" (Sherman 1998 in Boyce 2003:278).  This accountability of leaders causes them to at least attempt to justify their policies in ethical terms, using concepts like "good governance" and "human rights" in applying conditionality to aid packages, albeit inconsistently and according to their own agendas (Boyce 2003:278).

Peacebuilding is well suited to ethical conditionality, as it causes no conflict of interests - commercial ties and security are weakened by war or state collapse (Boyce 2003:278). Peace accords also contain specific benchmarks to judge performance, and therefore have a greater chance of success, as well as usually being supported by local movements - rather than being imposed by donors, in their own interests (Boyce 2003:278).

Public opinion in donor countries can make peacebuilding the dominant aim of policies, and “Smart Aid” can be applied selectively to benefit vulnerable groups, rather than the elite and leaders, as is often the case with other forms of developmental aid (Boyce 2003:279).

There appears to be agreement in current peacebuilding theory, that aid conditionality can be a potential tool to minimise the negative effects of aid and maximise access to those most affected by political crises - as long as it is not being used for political leverage instead (White & Cliffe 2000:337-8).

3.2 An Ethical Framework – Co-ordination and Accountability

Boyce 2003 concludes that it is essential to improve inter-donor co-ordination, transparency and accountability, as important steps toward sustainable Peacebuilding - without these reforms, aid conditionality would be ineffective (Boyce 2003:284-5), and selective application will create loopholes to be exploited by those with ulterior motives (Patrick 1999:49). 

What is apparently required is no less than the reconstruction of aid itself  - with conditionality being the best way to deal with multiple actors and competing interests in both the recipient and donor countries (Boyce 2003:286).

Even the UN is "a fragmented configuration of competing organisations" - the competition between the different organs for resources and responsibilities prevents effective co-ordination of Peacebuilding (Joint Inspection Unit in Patrick 1999:44).

Closer collaboration of NGOs is necessary to design aid interventions, mobilise resources, realise institutional reform, harmonise aid conditions, co-ordinate assistance locally, build recipient capacities and extend accountability (Patrick 1999:35).

There have also been calls to develop an international ethical framework or code of conduct for NGOs to separate political from humanitarian concerns, and support human rights struggles against states, territorial concerns and global capital (White & Cliffe 2000:337). Boyce 2003 advocates the need for Incentive Structures, where donors aim for quality not quantity alone, because currently the quality of aid initiatives is not evaluated, as recipients will have to repay IMF loans even if the money failed to promote development or peace (Boyce 2003:282-3).

There is also a desperate need for the mechanisms to write off past debts, and evaluate the effectiveness of aid in long-term peacebuilding (Boyce 2003:282-3). The ideology of a "level playing field", aimed for by privatisation and other neoliberal reforms, has actually caused unemployment, poverty and social polarisation (Boyce 2003:283). It is obvious that the distribution of the benefits and costs of rebuilding a nation affects both the vertical (class) and horizontal (ethnicity, race, religion, and region) strata of society (Boyce 2003:283).

This Peace conditionality should be introduced alongside the current developmental conditions, and according to Boyce 2003, involves "the use of formal performance criteria and informal policy dialogue to encourage the implementation of peace accords and the consolidation of peace" (Boyce 2003:267). The World Bank and IMF should incorporate criteria into their lending practices to monitor the effects on Peacebuilding and social tensions - similar to the current attention given to "good governance" and "sustainability" (Patrick 1999:48).

Currently, most organisations - like the World Bank - follow narrow economic approaches to investment (Boyce 2003:271). Peace conditionality is another dimension in international responsibility, and needs to be used alongside diplomatic pressure, trade sanctions, and peacekeeping forces (Boyce 2003:273).

3.3 Solidarity

The main challenges in realising relief-development synergies are seen by some as funding, timing and understanding (Smillie 1998 in White & Cliffe 2000:337). Another important obstacle is the "lack of institutional memory" - as workers are on short-term contracts, and emergency funding is influenced by media attention - when there should be more continuity and a building of relationships locally (White & Cliffe 2000:337).

This may be a result of the traditional value placed on remaining neutral as an aid organisation, but this concept must be replaced with solidarity if peacebuilding is to succeed (White & Cliffe 2000:337). Maximising the role of local staff and encouraging closer open relationships with local organisations and beneficiaries is essential (White & Cliffe 2000:338). It has been pointed out that this

"Softer value - [Solidarity/ Fraternity is] a social capital that enables people to work together, to trust each other, to commit to common causes - [and is] ...absolutely critical to societal success"

(Mulgan 2003 2003:18).

4. Facilitating Local Participation

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) identifies five levels of public participation in activities: information disclosure, which appears to happen on a need-to-know basis; public consultation, which is part of a pre-defined process driven by external actors who may not genuinely incorporate this feedback into the project; procedural participation, where people are encouraged to actively engage in project activities to achieve goals set for them; interactive partnership, which truly involves local actors, from planning to implementation and evaluation of projects; and self-mobilisation, when local proactive initiatives are merely facilitated by external actors to achieve locally defined goals (Pugh 2000:126-7).

In most cases, community participation is currently limited to the level of procedural participation and later evaluations are carried out by the implementing organisations, focusing on funding allocation rather than qualitative measurements (Pugh 2000:128). There are also concerns that global capital, in minimising state activity, interferes with national capacity building, income redistribution and community welfare (Pugh 2000:113).

International NGOs often create and train local NGOs, so even local organisations are influenced by the dominant neoliberalist paradigm, and subject to the "project-centered, donor-driven hierarchy" (Pugh 2000:119-120). 

The result of limited local participation in projects, states Pugh, is that interventions are focused on stability, law and order and entry into the global capitalist market, rather than achieving security, justice and empowerment (Pugh 2000:117).

As Duffield 2003 has observed, neoliberalism aims for a diminishing state, yet at the same time, development and welfare programs are dependent on a strong and proactive state (Pugh 2000:117).

The focus on creating a healthy civil society - the "alternative political arena" - has been criticised by Unvin and others, because of the superficial results generated by excessive external intervention (Pugh 2000:121-2). Civil society emerges from the slow historical processes of trust building, co-operation, compromise, inclusion and pluralism through many different non-state actors and organisations (Pugh 2000:121-2).

Externally-driven and enforced democratic reforms, including new constitutions and election processes, cause similar superficial results, and will not succeed unless local populations perceive their leaders to be accountable and legitimate, according to their own criteria and standards (Pugh 2000:124).

5. Research and Education, Capacity building and Preparation

There needs to be a flexibility in matching aid operations to ever-changing circumstances, which in turn requires an improvement in systems used for information and contextual analysis (White & Cliffe 2000:338). International policies need to "de-generalise" about the causes of state collapse, and their solutions - instead thorough research and analysis needs to precede recovery programs and Peacebuilding initiatives (Doornbos 2003 :58).

The Neoliberal interpretation of conflict as a temporary interference with development, could be counter-balanced by further research to analyse whether conflict is instead a product of the development process, as many believe (White & Cliffe 2000:337).

In addition, White and Cliffe feel that the failure to address the International dimension of political conflicts "normalises" crisis and simplifies the causes into internal factors - the solution is then seen as a need for sustainable development even during war (White & Cliffe 2000:320).

A standardised, transparent system is also necessary to track pledges and commitments, monitor the progress of reconstruction, and evaluate effectiveness (Patrick 1999: 61). It is clear to many that there is

"an abyss between the aims proclaimed by the United Nations and its resources for action, between the ambitiousness of its programs and the reality!" (de Senarclens 2003 2003:200).

Although much effort and money has gone into development of countries' economic, political and health sectors, the social aspects of development have been neglected - probably due to their unquantifiable nature (de Senarclens 2003 2003:200). However, development programs are political, and involve working with a government or military who are usually part of the problem - resulting in further abuse if the capacity building is targeted at these individuals (White & Cliffe 2000:320).

Conclusion:

Peacebuilding, according to the current paradigm, is too narrow, shallow and exclusive. It needs to be deeper, longer, higher and wider - deeper analysis and understanding, longer-term vision and planning, higher levels of consciousness and spirituality, and wider processes of solidarity and pluralism to include all participants across the board.

The International system appears to focus exclusively on economic and temporary solutions, resulting in a disappointing failure to extend compassion to victims of conflict, and strive for true peace.

Yet there is hope - as the former UN Security General, Annan, once declared:

"In today's world, given the technology and the resources around, we have the means to tackle...poverty, wipe out disease and forge peace...If we have the will, we can deal with them. You may think I am a dreamer. But without the dream you do not get anything done" (Rees 2000: 383).

Peacebuilders need to look to the past, and through this research, design practical programs to be implemented in the present, igniting the fire of a future vision to guide travellers towards social change and peace.

This change must involve everyone - each individual must be inspired and strengthened by the internal fire, contributing to the shared fire - realisation of the common vision depends on it.

Peace and conflict theorists are contributing towards this awakening by stirring the glowing embers of the fire, and exhorting Peacebuilders everywhere to rise up and take on the challenges with renewed vigour.

References:

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